Abstract-Networked systems are ubiquitous in today's world with examples spanning from ecology to the social and engineering sciences. Much of the research in networked systems is analytical, where the focus is on characterizing (and potentially influencing) the emergent collective behavior. A more recent trend of research focuses on the design of networked systems capable of achieving diverse and highly coordinated collective behavior in the absence of centralized control. Focusing on the well-studied class of maximum coverage problems, our first result demonstrates that any agent-based algorithm relying solely on local information induces a fundamental trade-off between the best and worst case performance guarantees, as measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability. Our second results demonstrates how to use an additional piece of system-level information to breach these limitations, thereby improving the system's performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A multiagent system can be characterized by a collection of individual subsystems, each making independent decisions in response to locally available information. Such a decision-making architecture can either emerge naturally as the results of self-interested behavior, e.g., drivers in a transportation network, or be the result of a design choice in engineered system. In the latter case, the need for distributed decision-making stems from the scale, spatial distribution, and sheer quantity of information associated with various problem domains that exclude the possibility for centralized decision making and control. One concrete example is the problem of monitoring the perimeter of a wild fire, where the goal is to deploy a collection of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to effectively survey the perimeter of a wild fire under the operational constraint that each UAV makes independent surveillance decisions in response to local information regarding its own aerial view of the landscape and minimal information regarding the state of neighboring UAVs [1] . Alternative examples include the use of robotic networks in post-disaster environments [16] , task scheduling and management [8] , water conservative food production [14] , fleets of autonomous vehicles [32] , and micro-scale medical treatments [31] .
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admissible control policies for the decision-making entities that ensure the emergent collective behavior is desirable with regards to a given system-level objective. At a high level, this design process entails specifying two key elements: the information available to each subsystem, attained either through sensing or communication, and a decision-making mechanism that prescribes how each subsystem processes available information to take decisions. The quality of a networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimensions including the stability and efficacy of the emergent collective behavior, characteristics of the transient behavior, in addition to communication costs associated with propagating information throughout the system. The focus of this paper is on the following two questions associated with the design of networked control systems.
(i) What are the decision-making rules that optimize the performance of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of informational availability? (ii) What is the value of information in networked control architectures? That is, how does informational availability translate to attainable performance guarantees for the emergent behavior through the design of appropriate decision-making mechanisms? This paper seeks to shed light on the answer to these two questions in a class of multiagent maximum coverage problems introduced in [11] . In a multiagent maximum covering problem we are given a ground set of resources, and n collections of subsets of the ground set. Every resource is associated with a respective value or worth. The systemlevel objective is to select one set from each collection so as to maximize the total value of covered elements. It is important to highlight that there are well-established centralized algorithms that can derive an admissible allocation of agents to resources that is within a factor of 1 − 1/e of the optimal allocation's value in polynomial time, provided that the n collections of subsets coincide (i.e. if we reduce to the max-n-coverage problem) [9] , [15] , [26] , [27] . Further, no polynomial time algorithm can provide a better approximation, unless P = N P. Unfortunately, the applicability of such centralized algorithms for the control of multiagent systems is limited given the concerns highlighted above.
This paper focuses on distributed approaches for reaching a near-optimal allocation where the individual agents make their covering selections in response to locally available information accordingly to a designed decision-making policy. The central goal here is to design agent decision-making rules that optimize the quality of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of informational availability. Of specific interest will be identifying how the level of information available to the individual agents impacts the attainable performance guarantees associated with the corresponding optimal networked control system.
In the spirit of [11] , [22] , we approach this problem through a game theoretic lens where we model the individual agents as players in a game and each agent is associated with a local objective function that guides its decision-making process. We treat these local objective functions as our design parameter and focus our analysis on characterizing the performance guarantees associated with the resulting equilibria of the designed game. Here, we model the informational restrictions discussed above as limitions on the amount of information that these local agent objective functions can depend on. We concentrate our analysis on two well-studied performance metrics in the game theoretic literature termed the price of anarchy and price of stability [2] , [13] . Informally, the price of anarchy provides performance guarantees associated with the worst performing equilibrium relative to the optimal allocation. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best performing equilibrium. The lack of uniqueness of equilibria implies that these bounds are often quite different. 1 The work of [11] was one of the first to view price of anarchy as a design objective rather than its more traditional analytical counterpart. The main results in [11] identify a set of agent objective functions that optimize the price of anarchy when agents are only aware of (i) the resources the agent can select and (ii) the number of agents covering these resources. Note that in this setting, any agent i is unaware of the covering options of any other agents j = i, as well as any resource values that the agent is unable to cover. Interestingly, [11] demonstrates that this optimal price of anarchy attains the same 1 − 1/e guarantees of the best centralized algorithms (even when the n collections of subsets are different), meaning that there is no degradation in terms of the worstcase efficiency guarantees when transitioning from the best centralized algorithm to the presented distributed algorithm that adheres to the prescribed informational limitations.
Our Contribution. The first question we address is whether utilizing the agent objective functions that optimize the price of anarchy has any unintended consequences with regards to other performance metrics of interest. The response is in the affirmative, as detailed in our first main theorem.
-In Theorem 3.1, we demonstrate that there is a fundamental trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability in such multiagent covering problems. That is, designing agent objective functions to improve the worst-case performance guarantees necessarily degrades the best-case performance guarantees. As corner cases, we demonstrate that any objective functions that ensure a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e also inherit a price of stability of at most 1 − 1/e. Note that having a price of stability smaller than 1 implies that the optimal allocation is not necessarily an equilibrium. Alternatively, any objective functions that ensure a price of stability of 1 also inherit a price of anarchy of at most 1/2.
This theorem characterizes the price of anarchy and price of stability frontier that is achievable through the design of agent objective functions in these multiagent covering problem.
The second main result of this manuscript focuses on the impact of information on the performance guarantees associated with the corresponding optimal agent objective functions. Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that there is a price of anarchy and price of stability frontier when agents are only aware of (i) the resources the agent can select and (ii) the number of agents covering these resources. The following theorem demonstrates that one can move beyond this frontier by providing the agents with additional information about the system at large.
-In Theorem 4.1, we identify a minimal (and easily attainable) piece of system-level information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with performance guarantees beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier provided in Theorem 3.1. When agents are provided with this additional information, which can be vaguely interpreted as the largest value of an uncovered resource in the system, one can derive agent objective functions that yield a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e and a price of stability of 1, which was unattainable without this additional piece of information.
The importance of this result centers on the fact that certain attributes of the system can be exploited in networked control architectures if that information is propagated to the agents. Hence, there are notable performance gains associated with propagating that piece of information throughout the system. In other words, this piece of system-level information has value with regards to the task of multiagent coordination. Minimizing the amount of information that needs to be propagated throughout the system to move beyond this frontier is clearly an important question that warrants future attention. Related Work. The results contained in this manuscript add to the growing literature of utility design, which can be interpreted as a subfield of mechanism design [7] where the objective is to design admissible agent objective functions to optimize various performance metrics, such as the price of anarchy and price of stability, [5] , [17] , [23] . While recent work in [12] has identified all design approaches that ensure equilibrium existence in local utility designs, in general the question of optimizing the worst-case efficiency of the resulting equilibria, i.e., optimizing the price of anarchy, is far less understood. Nonetheless, there are a few positive results in this domain worth reviewing. Beyond [11] , alternative problem domains where optimizing the price of anarchy has been explored include concave cost sharing games [20] , and reverse carpooling games [19] . More recently, the authors in [28] , [29] characterize and optimize the price of anarchy relative to a broader class of submodular and supermodular combinatorial optimization problems, rediscovering [11] as a special case. The bulk of the research regarding optimal utility design has concentrated on a specific class of objectives, termed budget-balanced objectives, which imposes the constraint that the sum of the agents' objectives is equal to the system welfare for every allocation. Within the confines of budget-balanced agent objective functions, several works have identified the optimality of the Shapley value objective design with regards to the price of anarchy guarantees [6] , [33] , [34] . However, the imposition of the budget-balanced constraint is unwarranted in the context of multiagent system design and its removal allows for improved performance, as shown in [11] and this manuscript.
Notation. We use N, R >0 and R ≥0 to denote the set of natural, positive and non negative real numbers; e is Euler's number.
II. MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
In this section we introduce the multiagent maximum coverage problem and our game theoretic model for the design of local decision-making mechanisms [11] . Further, we define the objectives and performance metrics of interest, as well as provide a review of the relevant literature.
A. Covering problems
Let R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be a finite set of resources where each resource r ∈ R is associated with a value v r ≥ 0 defining its importance. We consider a covering problem where the goal is to allocate a collection of agents N = {1, . . . , n} to resources in R in order to maximize the cumulative value of the covered resources. The set of possible assignments for each agent i ∈ N is given by A i ⊆ 2 R and we express an allocation by the tuple a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A n . The total value, or welfare, associated with an allocation a is given by
The goal of the covering problem is to find an optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation a opt ∈ A such that W (a opt ) ≥ W (a) for all a ∈ A. We will express an allocation a as (a i , a −i ) with the understanding that a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the collection of choices of the agents other than agent i.
B. A game theoretic model
This paper focuses on deriving distributed mechanisms for attaining near optimal solutions to covering problem where the individual agents make independent choices in response to local available information. Specifically, in this section we assume that each agent i has information only regarding the resources that the agent can select. Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process, here we focus on the design of local agent objective functions that adhere to these informational dependencies and will ultimately be used to guide the agents' selection process. To that end, we consider the framework proposed in [11] where each agent is associated with a local utility or objective function U i : A → R, and for any allocation a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ A, the utility of agent i is
where |a| r captures the number of agents that choose resource r in the allocation a, i.e., the cardinality of the set {i ∈ N : a i = r}, and f : N → R defines the fractional benefit awarded to each agent for selecting a given resource in allocation a. We will refer to f as the distribution rule throughout. Note that an agent's utility function in (2) is consistent with the local information available as it only depends on the resource that the agent selected, the number of agents that also selected this resource, as well as the distribution rule f and relevant resource value v r 2 . We will express such a n-agent welfare sharing game by the tuple G n = {N, R, {A i } i∈N , f, {v r } r∈R } and drop the subscripts on the above sets, e.g., denote {v r } r∈R as simply {v r }, for brevity.
The goal of this paper is to derive the distribution rule f that optimizes the performance of the emergent collective behavior. Here, we focus on the concept of pure Nash equilibrium as a model for this emergent collective behavior [25] . A pure Nash equilibrium, which we will henceforth refer to as just an equilibrium, is defined as an allocation a ne ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N and for all a i ∈ A i , we have
. In essence, an equilibrium represents an allocation for which no single agent has a unilateral incentive to alter its covering choice given the choices of the other agents. It is important to highlight that an equilibrium might not exist in a general game G n . Nevertheless, when restricting attention to the class of games with utility functions defined in (2), an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as the resulting game is known to be a congestion game [24] . 3 We will measure the efficiency of an equilibrium allocation in a game G n through two commonly studied measures, termed price of anarchy and price of stability, defined as follows:
where we use the notation a ne ∈ G n to imply an equilibrium of the game G n . In words, the price of anarchy characterizes the performance of the worst equilibrium of G n relative to the performance of the optimal allocation, while the price of stability focuses on the best equilibrium in the game G n . Such distinction is required as equilibria are guaranteed to exists for the class of utilities considered in (2), but in general they are not unique. By definition 0 ≤ PoA(G n ) ≤ PoS(G n ) ≤ 1. Throughout, we require that a system designer commits to a distribution rule without explicit knowledge of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. Note that once a particular distribution rule f has been chosen, this distribution rule defines a game for any realization of the parameters. The objective of the system designer is to provide desirable performance guarantees irrespective of the realization of these parameter, even if they where chosen by an adversary. To that end, let G n f denote the family of n-2 A different and apparently less restrictive choice might entail assigning different distribution rules to different players. However, given the anonymity and symmetry with which players' decisions enter in the welfare function W , working in this larger set of admissible utility functions will not improve the best achievable performance; see [11] for a discussion. For this reason, in the following we focus purely on utility functions of the form (2) . 3 There is a rich body of literature that provides distributed algorithms that can coordinate the agents to an equilibrium for the class of games considered in this paper [10] , [18] , [23] , [35] , [36] . However, we will not discuss such results due to space considerations. agent games induced by a given distribution rule f , i.e., any game G n ∈ G n f is of the above form. We will measure the quality of a distribution rule f by a worst-case analysis over the set of induced games G n f , which is the natural extension of the price of anarchy and price of stability defined above, i.e.,
The price of anarchy PoA(G n f ) for a given distribution rule f provides a bound on the quality of any equilibrium irrespective of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best equilibrium. 4 
III. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN THE PRICE OF STABILITY
AND PRICE OF ANARCHY In this section we provide our first main result that characterizes the inherent tension between the price of anarchy and price of stability as design objectives in multiagent maximum coverage problems. Here, we use the notation G f = ∪ n≥1 G n f to identify all maximum coverage games with an arbitrary number of players. Clearly, the price of anarchy (and similarly the price of stability) satisfies PoA(G f ) ≤ PoA(G n f ) for any n. (i) The optimal price of anarchy satisfies
(ii) Given a desired price of anarchy α ∈ [0, 1/2], the best attainable price of stability satisfies
(iii) Given a desired price of anarchy α ∈ (1/2, 1 − 1/e) and n ≥ 2, the best attainable price of stability satisfies
where Z(α, n) equals 1
(iv) Given a desired price of anarchy α = 1 − 1/e, the best attainable price of stability satisfies
(v) The bound in (7) is satisfied with equality if we restrict attention to single-selection maximum coverage games 4 One motivation for studying the price of stability is the availability of distributed learning rules that lead the collective behavior to the best equilibrium, e.g., [3] , [4] , [21] . 5 Note that G n f is well-defined for any n since f is of the form f : N → R.
where
The results of Theorem 3.1 are illustrated in Figure 1 . In particular, Theorem 3.1 establishes that there does not exist a distribution rule f that attains a price of stability and price of anarchy in the red region of the figure. Hence, there is an inherent tension between these two measures of efficiency as improving the performance of the worst equilibria necessarily comes at the expense of the best equilibria, and vice versa. The expression of Z(α, n) defines this trade-off and satisfies lim n→∞ Z(1 − 1/e, n) = 1 − 1/e. The last result demonstrates that this trade-off curve is tight in the context of single-selection maximum coverage games, i.e., there are distribution rules f that achieve joint price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees highlighted on the curve Z(α, n).
While the proof of Theorem 3.1 is omitted for brevity, here we highlight a few conclusions from the proof that are worthy of discussion. First, the unique distribution rule that optimizes the price of stability, i.e., achieves PoS(G f ) = 1, is the marginal contribution rule defined as
However, the price of anarchy satisfies PoA(G f mc ) = 1/2. Second, the unique distribution rule that optimizes the price of anarchy for a given n is of the form (11) and the accompanying price of anarchy guarantees are
Further, letting n → ∞ gives us PoA (G f ) = 1 − 1/e. However, Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that an unintended consequence associated with using f is that the price of stability also satisfies PoS (G f ) = 1−1/e. Lastly, one could fine tune the above analysis for cardinality restricted games, as in [11] , where there are limits on maximum number of agents that can select a given resource, i.e., max r∈R,a∈A |a| r ≤ k < n, to obtain a sharper characterization of the trade-off curve Z(α, n). The analysis of such cases is virtually identical to the forthcoming analysis.
IV. USING INFORMATION TO BREACH THE ANARCHY / STABILITY FRONTIER The previous section highlights a fundamental tension between the price of stability and price of anarchy for the given covering problem when restricted to local agent objective functions of the form (2) . In this section, we challenge the role of locality in these fundamental trade-offs. That is, we show how to move beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier given in Theorem 3.1 if we allow the agents to condition their choice on a higher degree of system-level information. To show this trade-off we restrict our attention to single-selection covering games.
With this goal in mind, we introduce a minimal and easily attainable piece of system-level information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with efficiency guarantees beyond this frontier. To that end, for each allocation demonstrates that the red region is also not achievable. That is, there does not exist a distribution rule achieving joint price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees in the red region. For example, if the desired price of anarchy is α ≤ 1/2, then a price of stability of 1 is attainable while meeting this price of anarchy demand. However, if the desired price of anarchy is α = 1 − 1/e, then a price of stability of 1 is no longer attainable. In fact, the best attainable price of stability is now also 1−1/e. The distribution rule values are specified for the case when n = 10. The trade-off curve Z(α, n) is illustrated for large n.
a ∈ A we define the information flow graph (V, E) where each node of the graph represents an agent and we construct a directed edge i → j if a i ∈ A j for i = j (no self loops). Based on this allocation-dependent graph, we define for each agent i the set N i (a) ⊆ N consisting of all the agents that can reach i through a path in the graph (V, E). Similarly, for each agent i we define
which consists of the union of A i and all the sets of other agents that can reach i through a path in the graph. An example is shown in Figure 2 . Building upon this graph we define the following quantities:
The term V i (a) captures the highest valued resource in agent i's choice set A i that is not covered by any agent. If the set A i \ a −i is empty, we set V i (a) = 0. Similarly, the term x i (a) captures the highest-valued resource in the enlarged set Q i (a) not currently covered by any other agent. If the set Q i (a) \ a is empty, we set x i (a) = 0.
We are now ready to specify the information based covering game with a set of agents N and each agent has an action set A i ⊆ R. Here, we consider a state-based distribution rule that toggles between the two extreme optimal distribution rules f and f mc . More formally, the distribution rule for agent i is now of the form
and the corresponding utilities are given by
, as we allow the system-level information x i (a) and V i (a) to prescribe which distribution rule each agent applies. We denote with f sb = {f sb i } i∈N the collection of distribution rules in (16) and informally refer to it as the state-based distribution rule. Throughout, we express the distribution rule as merely f
The next theorem demonstrates how f sb attains performance guarantees beyond the price of stability / price of anarchy frontier established in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.1: Consider any single-selection maximum coverage game with a state-based distribution rule f sb as defined above. First, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any game G ∈ G f sb . Furthermore, the price of anarchy and price of stability associated with the induced family of games G f sb is
Recall from Theorem 3.1 that a consequence of attaining a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e was a price of stability also of 1 − 1/e and this was achieved by f defined in (11) . Using the state-based rule given in (16), a system designer can achieve the optimal price of anarchy without any consequences for the price of stability. Hence, the identified piece of system-level information was crucial for moving beyond the inherited performance limitations by adhering to our notion of local information. Whether alternative forms of system-level information could move us beyond these guarantees, or achieve these guarantees with less information, is an open research question.
V. CONCLUSIONS
How should a system operator design a networked architecture? The answer to this question is non-trivial and involves weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with different design choices. In this paper we highlight one novel trade-off pertaining to the worst-case and best-case performance guarantees in distributed maximum coverage problems with local information. Further, we demonstrate how a system designer can move beyond these trade-offs by equipping the agents with additional information about the system. Fully realizing the potential of multiagent systems requires the pursuit of a more formal understanding of the inherent limitations and performance trade-offs associated with networked architectures. While this paper focused purely on two performance measures, other metrics of interest include convergence rates, robustness to adversaries, fairness, among others. In each of these settings, it is imperative that a system operator fully understands the role of information within these trade-offs. Only then, will a system operator be able to effectively balance the potential performance gains with the communication costs associated with propagating additional information through the system.
